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Abstract 
It has been 20 years since the concept of Autonomous Oceanographic Sampling 
Network (AOSN) was first introduced. This vision has been brought closer to reality 
with the introduction of undersea gliders. Whilst in terms of functionality the undersea 
glider has shown to be capable of meeting the AOSN vision, in terms of reliability 
there is no community-wide hard evidence on whether persistent presence is currently 
being achieved.  This paper studies the reliability of undersea gliders in order to assess 
the feasibility of using these platforms for future AOSN.  The data used is taken from 
205 deployments of gliders by 12 European laboratories between 2008 and 2012. Risk 
profiles were calculated for two makes of deep underwater glider; there is no 
statistically significant difference between them. Regardless of make the probability of 
a deep undersea glider surviving a 90 day mission without pre-mature mission end is 
approximately 0.5. The probability of a shallow undersea glider surviving 30 day 
mission without premature mission end is 0.59.  This implies that to date factors other 
than the energy available are preventing undersea gliders achieving their maximum 
capability. This reliability information was used to quantify the likelihood of two 
reported undersea glider surveys meeting the observation needs for a period of 6 
months and to quantify the level of redundancy needed to in order to increase the 
likelihood of meeting the observation needs.  
2 
1. Introduction 1 
There has been a significant increase in the use of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) during 
the last decade and this trend seems set to continue
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2. We suggest there are two key reasons: ship 
based field work is very expensive; and second, these vehicles, whether in industry or scientific 
research, have been shown to be capable of obtaining valuable data that augment pre-existing 
means such as moorings, towed systems and profiling floats (Perry et al. 2008a).  Nevertheless, it is 
appropriate to ask if they have yet fulfilled their true potential. Twenty years ago Curtin et al. 
(1993), presented the requirements for an autonomous ocean sampling network (AOSN) which 
comprised several autonomous underwater vehicles and a distributed set of acoustic and point 
sensors to enable four dimensional ocean sampling. Since then, several concerted efforts have 
developed and tested technology to implement this vision. One of the most significant 
developments is a class of autonomous underwater vehicle denoted as undersea gliders (Stommel, 
1989). These slow-moving, long endurance, compact, affordable, buoyancy driven vehicles can be 
used for monitoring large and meso-scale processes which is currently impossible to do using 
conventional, propelled driven, AUVs or moorings, and expensive if using research ships and towed 
vehicles. A number of marine science programs have demonstrated the benefits of undersea gliders. 
For example, Perry et al. (2008b) used an undersea glider to gain deep understanding of blooms 
located of the coast of Washington. Perry et al. gathered evidence to conclude that what satellite 
imagery led scientists to believe was an autumn bloom caused by destratification was instead a 
vertical redistribution of phytoplankton. Furthermore the authors concluded that the concentration at 
chlorophyll maxima was three times that predicted using satellite imagery only. Todd et al. (Todd et 
al., 2011) used undersea gliders to assess the underwater effects of El Niño on the Californian 
Current System (CCS). The authors concluded that whilst CCS was unusually warm and isopycnals 
unusually deep there were no anomalous water masses in the region. Hatun et al. (Hatun, 2007) 
 
2 For example, see the summary of a market report at http://www.douglas-westwood.com/shop/shop-
infopage.php?longref=902~0#.UVlK8BlBH8g accessed 1 April 2013.  
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used two undersea gliders to sample eddies in order to understand how these contribute to the rapid 
restratification of the Labrador Sea interior following winter time convention.  
Developments in communications, intelligent mission planning and sampling methods devised over 
the years have brought the AOSN vision closer to reality (Curtin et al., 2005, Leonard et al., 2010, 
Alvarez and Mourre, 2012a, Alvarez and Mourre, 2012b, L’Hévéder et al., 2013). Are we now at 
the stage when users can plan glider missions in full expectation of being able to achieve missions 
only limited by the sensors and the stored energy? To answer that question requires a study of how 
well gliders have performed on actual missions. However, over the years little or no study has been 
made on the reliability of undersea gliders.  Results of risk, reliability and availability analyses 
conducted for propelled autonomous underwater vehicles (Brito et al., 2010, Brito and Griffiths, 
2011, Brito et al., 2012, Podder and Bellingham, 2004, Griffiths, 2003) cannot be used to infer the 
reliability of undersea gliders because details of implementation in hardware and software matter. 
This paper investigates the reliability of undersea gliders, resulting in a risk profile as a function of 
mission endurance based on the operational history of 56 undersea gliders during the period January 
2008 to May 2012.  The success of glider missions is dependent upon a number of factors: the 
inherent reliability of the component parts, the service history of the vehicles, the environment in 
which they operate and the practices and procedures of the vehicle operators.  We have not 
attempted to separate all of these factors.  The focus here is to create a risk profile based on user 
experiences using commercially available of the shelf (COTS) gliders. Following the creation of the 
risk profile we study the effect of some potential covariates in the risk profile. We close with a 
probabilistic method for quantifying the likelihood of a set of undersea gliders providing coverage 
for a pre-defined observation time. This process allows the user to estimate how many undersea 
gliders are required in order to meet a given ocean coverage.  
 
 
 
4 
2. Undersea gliders 1 
Gliders propel themselves by use of a buoyancy engine and thus must follow a sawtooth trajectory 
through the water.  The horizontal speed is typically about 1 km per hour.  By travelling slowly and 
using minimal power they are able to achieve endurance of several months.  The first scientific 
missions with gliders were undertaken by the teams who developed the vehicles and their 
collaborators (e.g. Rudnick et al. 2004). But since about 2005 gliders have become available to the 
wider scientific community and COTS undersea gliders are being increasingly used by a growing 
number of institutions. At the time of this study there were three main COTS undersea gliders, the 
Slocum (
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Webb et al., 2001), the Seaglider 1000 (Eriksen et al., 2001) and the Spray (Sherman et al., 
2001)3. These are typically equipped with conductivity, temperature, depth, fluorescence and 
optical backscatter sensors, but many other sensors have been used.  
3. Ocean Coverage Estimation 12 
The term ocean coverage is used here to describe the likelihood that a target area will be observed 
for a required period of time. The ocean coverage is therefore inherently dependent on the glider 
reliability. Thus in this section we will first address the problem of estimating undersea glider 
survival with mission endurance. Two approaches are presented. First we present a non-parametric 
method for estimating the probability of survival of an undersea glider. In this paper we consider 
two different consequences and therefore the term survival has two meanings. We use probability of 
survival to denote the likelihood of an undersea glider surviving a mission without premature end. 
The term probability of survival is also used to capture the likelihood of an undersea glider 
surviving a mission without loss.  The Kaplan Meier estimator is used for modelling both scenarios. 
The probability of survival varies with travel time. A second method, the Cox-Proportional hazards 
model, is then presented to assess the impact of covariates.  
 
 
 
3 More recent gliders such as the Exocetus coastal glider and the SeaExplorer were not generally available 
during the study period. 
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a. Survival estimation 1 
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Methods for estimating the probability of survival based on historic data can be parametric and non 
parametric (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980). Parametric models assume that the probability of 
failure follows a particular trend, such as linear increasing failure rate or constant rate over time. 
Non-parametric models make no assumption with regards to the failure distribution. The survival 
dataset consists of two types of data: failure data and censored data. Failure data consists of the 
recorded time at which failure took place. In statistical survival modelling, a censored entry is an 
observation where failure was not observed. In our analysis the glider is known to have survived a 
given mission time, this is denoted a right censored data entry.  The Kaplan Meier estimator 
(equation 1) is a typical method for estimating the probability of survival based on the failure 
history. It estimates the probability of failure in a given interval, from the fraction of the number of 
entries that failed at that interval over the number of entries that have not failed. The number of 
entries that have not failed in interval i are denoted by ni. The number of entries that have failed 
during interval i are denoted as di. The estimator uses the product rule for calculating the probability 
S(k) of a system surviving a sequence of k intervals. 
S k ^  ni di
ni



i0
ik  1. 16 
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The variance for the original Kaplan-Meier estimator is typically computed using the “exponential” 
Greenwood formula (Prentice and Kalbfleisch, 2002): 
Vˆ k   1
(logSˆ(k))2
di
ni (ni  di )rik  2. 20 
21 
22 
23 
The variance is a function of the number of entries at any given interval. It is very important to take 
into account the variance as this has a direct effect on the confidence limits for the survival 
estimates as presented in equations 3 and 4.  
exp(exp(c (k)))  Sˆ(k)  exp(exp(c (k))) 3. 24 
25 where: 
6 
c (k)  log( log Sˆ(k)) z /2 Vˆ  4. 1 
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and where zα/2 is the upper α/2 point of the standard normal distribution; the 5% point is used in this 
paper, which is 1.96. 
b. Proportional Hazards Analysis 4 
Estimating whether other variables have an influence on risk is almost as important as the 
estimation of risk itself. The basic Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) attempts to fit 
survival data with covariates z to a hazard function. The hazard function is the ratio between the 
failure rate and the cumulative survival function. In order the assess whether covariates influence 
the survival distribution the proportional hazards models uses linear regression technique to 
estimate the values of the correlation estimates β1, β2,… βn. 
  nn zzzethzth   ...0 2211)|(  5. 11 
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If the correlation variable is greater than 0 an increase in the respective covariate causes an increase 
in survivability. If the correlation variable is lower than 1, it means that an increase in the respective 
correlation variable causes a decrease in survivability. A value of 0 means that there is no 
correlation between the covariate and the survivability. The model is fitted using the maximum 
likelihood estimator (MLE). Cox (1972) showed that the likelihood function for the proportional for 
the proportional hazards model (equation 5) is given by:   
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The hypothesis test is a procedure that enables us to assess the extent to which an observed set of 
data is consistent with a null hypothesis.  
c. Coverage estimation 21 
Having presented means for quantifying the likelihood of a glider surviving a given time, this 
section addresses the question of how many gliders are needed in order to meet a given coverage. 
7 
We start with the known probability of failure and then use probability rules for deriving the 
formulation used for calculating the coverage.  
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
Given that we know an instantiation of the probability of failure p(T), at or before time T, which we 
will denote as p.  If we wish to improve the probability of continuous monitoring during the time T 
then we could deploy more than one glider.   The probability of r failures amongst a group of N 
gliders can be computed using the binomial distribution: 
    rNrN ppr
N
rP 


 11,    7. 
Where , also denoted as r choose N, rCN is 



r
N
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!
rNr
N
 .     The probability that at least one glider 
survives for the time T is given by 
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If the period of observations required exceeds the total endurance then multiple missions are 
required.  For M sequential mission each with N gliders.  The probability of at least one glider 
surviving each mission can be calculated as 
    MNMN pNPPsurv  11,1    9. 14 
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4. GROOM Undersea Glider Operational History 16 
The task of gathering a broad representative sample of operational histories of glider deployments 
was undertaken as part of a EU Framework 7 project, GROOM. The GROOM project4 has 18 
European partners, of which 12 operate gliders, working together to “design a new European 
Research Infrastructure that uses underwater gliders for collecting oceanographic data”. The 
participants were encouraged to provide operational data representative of a period of two years of 
operation. An online survey prompted the user to enter: 1. the organization name; 2. the point of 
contact; 3. vehicle identifier; 4. start of mission date; 5. vehicle type (Slocum G1 shallow, Slocum 
 
4 See http://www.groom-fp7.eu/doku.php  
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G1 Deep, Slocum G2 Shallow, Slocum G2 Deep, Seaglider1000, Spray); 6. mission type (shelf 
deployment, shelf edge deployment, deep ocean deployment); 7. mission length in days; 8. mission 
maximum depth in metres; 9. did the mission end in failure (yes or no); 10. Was the pre-mission test 
successful? 11. was the vehicle recovered at the end of the mission? 
If the mission had ended in failure the user was prompted to select from 15 primary causes: 1. 
Collision with vessel; 2. Collision with seabed; 3. Collision with nets or other obstacle; 4. Iridium 
communications failure; 5. Leak; 6. Buoyancy pump failure; 7. Power/Battery failure; 8. 
Command/Control software failure (includes basestation); 9. Onboard software failure; 10. Data 
logging failure; 11. Navigation sensor failure – GPS; 12. Altitude sensor failure (heading, pitch or 
roll); 13. Sensor failure; 14. Altitude control; 15. Other failure (in this case, the user was encourage 
to write more details). If the mission had ended in failure the user was prompted to answer what 
was the status of the altimeter at the time of the fault (bottom within range, bottom outside range).  
Amongst undersea glider operators the words 'abort' and 'mission' can have different technical 
meanings so we clarify here the meaning as used in this paper.  We use the word mission to refer to 
a single glider operation from the time of deployment to the time of recovery.  A successful mission 
is one where operation continued until the planned recovery.  During a mission there may be a 
technical problem but if these are resolved without having to end the mission prematurely we class 
the mission as successful. If however the mission is terminated prematurely because of technical 
issues then we class this as an aborted mission. 
a. Mission statistics 20 
Reports were received on 205 missions carried out by 56 undersea gliders. The number of missions 
and the number of gliders used varied significantly from one institution to another (Table 1).  
Table 1 goes here 
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The statistics for different vehicle makes are presented below.  
Table 2 goes here 
As noted previously the success of glider missions is dependent not just on the reliability of the 
particular type of glider used, but also upon the service history of the vehicle, the environment in 
which it operates and the practises and procedures of the operators.  Furthermore whether or not a 
failure leads to loss of the vehicle is very much dependent upon the available options for recovery.  
In our survey, five of the vehicles that were lost were Seagliders deployed in Arctic or Antarctic 
waters where there very limited opportunities for emergency recovery.  Thus, although more 
Seagliders were lost it is not possible to conclude that they are inherently more likely to be lost than 
Slocums. 
b. Failure Modes 11 
A total of 63 mission aborts were recorded during the 205 missions. Seventeen specific failure 
modes have been identified (Figure 1). For four failures the root cause remains unknown. In 
general, there are a small number of observations for each failure mode, therefore it is not possible 
to infer if a particular vehicle make is more prone to a particular failure mode than another make. 
However, for the three most common failure modes we have compared the failure rate for Slocum 
gliders (deep, shallow, G1 and G2) with that for Seagliders. The results are shown in Table 3. For 
each failure mode we tested the null hypothesis that the failure rate for Slocums and Seagliders was 
indistinguishable. By comparing the actual difference in failure rates with the standard error of the 
difference the probability of true failure rates being different can be calculated using the two 
proportion z-test, Table 3. 
Table 3 goes here 
Failure due to a leak was the most observed failure mode. Fourteen out of fifteen of these failures 
occurred on Slocum vehicles. So the rate of occurrence was about three times greater for Slocum 
gliders. One possible explanation is that Slocum vehicles are opened by users more often than 
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Seaglider1000s, as Seagliders have generally been serviced by the makers. Therefore the O-rings of 
the Slocum vehicles tend to be more disturbed than the O-rings on the Seaglider1000. 
The second most common failure mode was power/battery issues, these occurred seven times more 
frequently for Seagliders than for Slocums. Without further information we cannot give an 
explanation for this difference. The third most common failure mode was buoyancy pump failure. 
The failure rates for the two different undersea glider makes are indistinguishable for this failure 
mode.  
Figure 1 goes here. 
c. Failure Analysis 9 
Underlying the procedure used in this section is the assumption that there are no significant 
differences between survival times of each group, that is, the difference that has been observed is 
due to chance variation. Two well known tests used for comparing survival distributions are the log-
rank and the Wilcoxon tests.  
When we applied these tests to compare the survival distributions of the Seaglider 1000 and Slocum 
G1 deep we concluded that there is no evidence against the null hypothesis. As presented in column 
3 of Table 4, the values of P from both tests suggest that differences between the survival of the 
Seaglider 1000 and that of a Slocum G1 deep are not statistically significant. When we compared 
the Slocum G2 deep survival distribution with the distribution of the aggregated dataset of Slocum 
G1 deep and Seaglider 1000 we concluded that that there is no evidence against the null hypothesis. 
Since the differences between the failure distributions of Seaglider1000, Slocum G1 deep and 
Slocum G2 deep are not statistically significant we can aggregate the mission data of these three 
vehicles to make a unique dataset that represents the operational history of deep undersea gliders. If 
we consider the shallow gliders: Slocum G1 shallow and Slocum G2 shallow. The large values of P 
indicate that the difference in the failure distribution for these two types of vehicles is not 
statistically significant. Therefore the operational history for both vehicles can be aggregated to 
form a unique dataset corresponding to shallow undersea gliders.   
11 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
26 
Table 4 goes here 
5. Undersea Gliders Survival 2 
Here we present the results of survival analysis carried out on the glider mission data collected from 
the GROOM project participants. A mission risk profile is created for each type of undersea glider 
and the Cox- proportional hazards method, presented in section 3.2, is used for estimating the effect 
of different covariates.  The survival analyses are carried for two scenarios: abort and loss.  
a. Likelihood of Undersea Glider Abort 7 
The analyses were carried out for the deep undersea gliders and for the shallow undersea gliders 
separately. The deep undersea gliders dataset consisted of 128 missions; the shallow of 77 missions. 
The probability of a vehicle completing its planned mission without aborting is presented in Figures 
2a and 2b. The 95% confidence limits are presented in gray; they increase with endurance, as there 
are fewer missions of longer endurance. 
The probability of the mission not ending in abort appears to decrease relatively rapidly during the 
first 15 days for deep gliders and the first 5 days for shallow gliders but after this time appears to 
decrease at a constant rate.  This suggests that the failure rate is almost constant with time beyond 
the first few days. That is, for example, failures are just as likely to emerge in the sixth week of 
deployment as during the fourth week. This contrasts with the profiles for the Autosub and ISE 
Explorer propeller-driven AUVs, where the risk profile reduces more significantly in the first tens 
of kilometres, allowing risk mitigation by monitoring the vehicle for this distance before 
committing to the mission (Brito, Griffiths et al., 2010; Brito, Griffiths et al., 2012) Because of the 
almost constant failure rate, a monitoring distance would not be as effective a risk mitigation 
strategy for gliders.  
b. Likelihood of Undersea glider Loss 23 
In the 205 missions considered in this study, 10 of them resulted in vehicle loss, 8 of the losses were 
for deep undersea gliders, and 2 of the losses were for shallow undersea gliders. The probability of 
a shallow undersea glider surviving a deployment is presented in Figure 2c and the probability of 
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survival of a deep undersea glider is presented in Figure 2d.  For shallow undersea gliders, the 
survival distribution shows that the probability of a glider surviving a 30 day mission is 0.9. The 
probability of a deep undersea glider vehicle surviving a 30 day mission is 0.97. For both 
distributions the 95% confidence interval is quite large.  
Figure 2 goes here 
6. Proportional Hazards 6 
The proportional hazards method (section 4) was used to examine evidence on whether operational 
factors influenced the abort and loss outcomes. The analyses were carried out using the JMP 
statistical analysis tool from SAS. The estimates for the hazard analysis are presented in Table 5.  
a. Effect of Operational Depth 10 
For the abort scenario results show that there is a high confidence in the proportional hazard 
estimates for both shallow and deep gliders.  Negative values for β1 indicates that the probability of 
an abort reduces with increasing operational depth. For the loss scenario, results show that there is 
no dependency between the probability of loss and the glider operational depth. The P values for 
both shallow and deep gliders are large.  
Table 5 goes here 
b. Effect of Altimeter status 17 
One of the ‘autonomous’ behaviours of the glider is in its ability to detect and react to the presence 
of the seafloor, that is, it can determine when to inflect if the bottom depth is less than the 
commanded inflexion. Getting this wrong could lead to collision with the seafloor and possible 
consequential damage, e.g. to the hull (leaks), the sensors, possibly communications antenna, 
possibly external bladder, hence buoyancy engine problem. In this section we attempt to establish 
whether there is a correlation between the vehicle loss and the status of the altimeter.   
For 7 of the 16 aborts that occurred on shallow vehicles the bottom was outside the range of the 
altimeter. Of the 47 failures that occurred on deep undersea gliders, for 16 of them the vehicle was 
within altimeter range of the bottom. For both shallow and deep gliders, the proportional hazard 
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analyses confirm that there is no correlation between the status of the altimeter and the probability 
of the glider being lost. 
7. Example of Coverage Estimation 3 
The previous two sections have discussed the reliability of undersea gliders in detail and have 
identified areas where the reliability of these vehicles can be improved. In this section we assess the 
impact of undersea glider reliability on mission planning. In subsection a, we consider the situation 
where a single glider is required to survey an area for a long period of time. Two case studies are 
considered, 180-day mission and 360-day mission. We estimate the likelihood of this survey being 
successful. Then we consider the impact of adding redundancy, that is, using multiple gliders to 
improve reliability.  
A small number of glider fleet configurations have been tested in recent years, with different 
degrees of success (Rudnick et al., 2004)(Hodges and Fratantoni, 2009)(Testor et al. 2007).  In this 
section we consider the impact of undersea glider reliability on the risk of a glider network design 
and operation. In subsection b we conduct reliability analysis of the ‘virtual’ mooring array 
proposed by Hodges and Fratantoni (2009). In subsection c we considered the network design 
proposed by L’Hévéder et al (2013). 
a. Single measurement location 17 
The huge benefit of undersea gliders is the ability for long endurance missions. However as 
indicated by our data, few missions make use of the full endurance. In this case study we consider 
that the aim is to have at least one glider in continuous operation for a given period of time, in a 
situation where replacement gliders cannot be deployed to cover failures. The probability of 
achieving this, as a function of the number of gliders, can be calculated using Equation 12. Taking 
the deep glider example, based on Figure 2 we assume the practical upper limit of endurance is 180 
days. The minimum number of missions (M) for the 180 day coverage is one, whilst for the 360 day 
coverage is two. Figure 3 presents the probability of providing continuous coverage with one or 
more deep gliders, for the two periods of interest 180 days and 360 days.  
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Figure 3 goes here 
Figure 3 shows that for deep undersea gliders we would need to deploy 10 gliders in order to 
achieve 0.95 probability of successfully providing continuous coverage for 180 days without 
replacement. A fleet 20 gliders would be required to have a probability of 0.92 for continuous 
coverage over 360 days. 
However, if we were to consider a shorter mission length, were possible, it would yield a different 
requirement in terms of the number of gliders. For example, for deep undersea gliders, a mission 
length of 25 days would have a probability of premature end of 0.27. If we were to run 4 gliders per 
25-day mission over a period of 360 days, the probability of providing coverage is 0.93. At least 8 
gliders would be needed, and this would imply that we would have to rotate the gliders 14 times 
during the year. The fleet size and mission length combinations can be selected to meet a desirable, 
or at least acceptable, coverage target.  
The above results indicate that shorter deployments will achieve the same level of confidence whilst 
having fewer gliders deployed at any one time.  However in practice the choice of strategy would 
also have to take into account the cost of different scenarios and other factors.  
The calculations above are very conservative and are intended to give an approximate indication of 
the number of vehicles required.  In practice it will not always be necessary to recover all gliders at 
the same time.  A more efficient strategy would be to only recover each glider when necessary, 
however, it is important to take into consideration the time required to organise a new deployment 
and for a glider to navigate to the operational area.  
b. Virtual mooring array case study 21 
If currents are not stronger than the glider’s speed, a glider can be programmed to perform repeated 
profiles while holding horizontal position nearly constant. This mode of sampling is known as a 
“virtual mooring”.  An example of this is the virtual mooring array deployed for 10 days in the 
Philippine Sea, east of Luzon Strait (Hodges and Fratantoni, 2009). During this experiment five 
Slocum shallow gliders were deployed in five different positions.  
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Using the analysis in the previous section we can consider the likely success of this array if it were 
continued for a period of 6 months. The probability of at least one virtual mooring failure is 
calculated as follows: 1- (1-pf1)·(1-pf2)·(1-pf3)·(1-pf4)·(1-pf5). Where pfi is the probability of the 
glider holding station i failing to maintain station for 6 months. We will assume that shallow gliders 
are used. Given that the probability of failure for a single 60-day mission is 0.49, and three 
sequential 60 day mission are required, pfi is easily calculated as 0.867. Therefore the probability of 
at least one failure over three deployments at each of the five sites of the proposed network is 
0.99996. This puts a requirement for adding undersea glider redundancy at each station. If each 
station comprises four undersea gliders, the probability that at least one of the four gliders at each 
site will complete a single 60-day mission (pfm1) is 1-0.49^4 = 0.9424. This results in probability of 
at least one of the sites of the array not returning a complete record of 0.589.  
 
c. Glider network for a synoptic view of the oceanic mesoscale variability case study 13 
L’Hévéder et al (2013) considered the minimum number of gliders needed to sample mesoscale 
variability. The authors propose to deploy an array of gliders in a comb structure. The optimal 
number of gliders was selected to maximize the analysis skill evaluation objective and minimise the 
objective analysis error. The analysis skill evaluation objective was quantified by a combination of 
the root mean square error and the spatial pattern correlation between the glider networks simulated 
data and the controlled field data. The objective analysis error objective was calculated based on the 
minimum error variance. The authors demonstrated that the optimum number of gliders necessary 
to sample mesoscale variability was ten.  We will assume that all the gilders are deep gilders.  In the 
previous section we considered the number of gliders that needed to be deployed so that there 
would be a high probability of one or more of them completing the mission.  An alternative strategy 
would be, if it is possible, to replace each glider that fails during the mission. When large numbers 
of gliders are needed, such as in this example, we expect this to require fewer resources.  However, 
coverage will not be as complete when we take into account the time required to replace a vehicle.  
16 
Here we consider the number of gliders required for this strategy.  To do so we make the 
assumption that the failure rate is constant in time.  If the probability of a glider failing in a given 
time interval 
1 
2 
T  is  then given a batch of N gliders the probability of x of them failing is  Tp  3 
 pNxBTxq ,,),(   10. 4 
Where B is the binomial distribution. In the limit of T  being very small we can ignore the 
possibility of multiple failures in any one time interval and so the probability of there being L 
failures during a time 
5 
6 
TMT   is approximately.  7 
   qMLBNTLQ ,,,,   11. 8 
9 where 
    11,1  NpNpTqq  12. 10 
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The probability distribution of the number of replacements for a 10 glider deployment is shown in 
Figure 4.  For a typical survivability of 0.5 for a 90-day deep glider deployment the expected 
number of replacements is 7 and there is a 16% chance that 10 or more will be needed.  
Figure 4 goes here 
d. Improving reliability 
Reliability improvement of undersea gliders will be possible if communication between users and 
manufacturers is proactive, enabling the discussion of failure modes and potential mitigation 
activities. Such reliability improvement has occurred on profiling floats. Profiling floats had a life 
expectancy of 4 years, performing 150 cycles during this period. However in 2001 only 20% of the 
APEX floats could meet this requirement (Kobayashi, 2009). The fact that faulty floats could not be 
recovered made it difficult to identify the root causes for failures. Nevertheless, research institutes 
and the manufacturer engaged in fault investigations and a number of improvements were made as a 
result. For example, the batteries of the early floats had a design vulnerability that meant that every 
time a battery cell was damaged it caused a chain reaction, in which other battery cells in the same 
pack would also fail. The battery circuit design was changed; a diode was introduced between cells 
so that if one cell is damaged it will not damage the cell next to it. Another improvement was made 
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with regards to the piston used to control the buoyancy. The pump used in the early APEX float 
allowed small sediments to mix with the oil. This would eventually cause the piston to get stuck in a 
fixed position. A new pump was designed by the manufacturer that did not have this failure mode.   
In this section we study the impact of reliability improvement in the confidence that the glider 
network design will meet the observation target.  
First we consider the case of a single measurement location as in section a above.  Figure 3 shows 
that if the reliability of an undersea glider is increased to 90% this results in a high confidence that 
the coverage target will be met with fewer gliders. For deep gliders, a deployment of 2 gliders 
would give a confidence of 98% that the target measurements would be obtained with one or more 
glider for a period of 360 days. 
For the multiple glider deployment considered in section c, Figure 4 shows that if the success rate 
for 90 day missions can be increased from 0.5 to 0.9 the number of gliders required to assure a 10 
glider deployment is likely to be greatly reduced, with the expected number of replacements being 
one and the chance of needing three or more being only 9%. 
If the top three failure modes identified in this study: leaks, battery failure and buoyancy pump 
failure are mitigated this would lead to a change in the risk profile. Figure 5 presents the survival 
distribution for considering that the three top failure modes were completely mitigated. Each failure 
was replaced with a censored entry. Since each failure resulted in an early mission termination. 
Thus replacing the failure flag with a censored flag would not result in a risk improvement. 
Therefore we assume that the endurance for each one of these failure entries equals the average of 
the endurance of all missions that were successful. For shallow undersea gliders the average 
endurance of all successful missions was 13 days whilst for deep undersea glider this was 43 days.  
Figure 5 goes here 
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The probability of shallow glider surviving, with no premature mission end, a 60 day is 0.58, .09 
increase from the unmitigated case. The probability of a deep glider surviving a 180 day mission is 
0.48, a 0.2 increase from the unmitigated case.   
8. Conclusions 4 
We used fault history data from 205 glider missions to build risk profiles with endurance. We 
concluded that the risk profiles of different undersea glider makes are not statistically significant. 
Therefore our analysis focused on two classes of gliders: deep and shallow. For shallow gliders we 
concluded that the probability of not aborting a 30 day mission is approximately 0.5. For deep 
undersea gliders the probability of not aborting a 90 day mission is approximately 0.5. A key 
observation is that successful glider deployments with vehicles available today imply conducting 
missions that are well below the maximum endurance of the vehicle.  
The paper presents a probabilistic framework for calculating the coverage that can be achieved by a 
fleet of undersea gliders. We showed how the probability of successfully meeting a required 
coverage can be calculated using the survival estimate for a given mission.  In the example provided 
we considered that all missions were of equal endurance. In practical terms missions can be of 
different endurance. In addition, in the example, we considered that the vehicles were deployed 
concurrently. Again this may not be the case in practice. However, despite these assumptions, the 
probabilistic formalism presented in this paper still applies to the different scenarios mentioned.  
These glider failure profiles have a similarity in form to those of relatively early APEX floats 
(2000/01 and 2003) in the analysis of (Kobayashi, 2009). APEX floats deployed in subsequent 
years generally showed a growth in reliability, such that by 2006 the probability of completing 100 
cycles was over 90%, compared with ~20% in 2000/01. The challenge for manufacturers is to 
achieve the same reliability growth for gliders. 
In targeting this reliability issue user feedback to manufacturers to inform on-going developments 
by manufacturers is important. By doing so the glider reliability can grow, as has shown to be 
possible from the APEX float experience reviewed in this paper.  
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If, for example the probability of failure for a 180 day deep glider mission could be reduced from 
0.73 to 0.25 the number of gliders needed to be deployed simultaneously to achieve 95% coverage 
would be reduced from 10 to 3. 
Undersea gliders are arguably one of the most significant technology developments in autonomous 
underwater sampling.  They provide an effective way to conduct marine science surveys, and for 
some missions completely eliminate the costs associated with surface vessels.  The perception is 
that undersea gliders are a relatively cheap alternative to measurements made from ships and 
moorings.  However, in this paper we have shown that in order to achieve a high level of confidence 
in obtaining data multiple undersea gliders are required.  Therefore when evaluating the cost of 
undersea glider observations the number of vehicles required to meet the necessary level of 
confidence needs to be considered.  Using current technology and practices, a high level of 
confidence may require a costly operation.  However, if glider manufacturers and operators can 
achieve a similar improvement in reliability as was made for ARGO floats the costs will fall 
significantly.  
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Table 1. Summary of the data provided by the participating oceanographic laboratories. 
Centre Name Number of 
Missions 
Start date – End 
date 
Number of 
vehicles 
Median 
Endurance 
[days] 
Shelf Shelf edge Deep Ocean 
Centre National de la Reserche 
Scientifique (CNRS).  
56 April 2010 to 
March 2012 
14 32 12% 84% 4% 
Agencia Estatal Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones cientificas (CSIC).  
14 April 2011 and 
May 2011 
5 19 - - 100% 
Istituto Nazionale di Oceanografia e di 
Geofisica Sperimentale OGS (OGS).  
4 June 2008 and 
July 2010 
2 13 75% - 25% 
Alfred-Wegener-Institut Fuer Polarund 
Meeresforschung (AWI).  
8 July 2008 and 
July 2012 
4 69 - - 100% 
Consorcio para el diseno, construccion, 
equipamiento y explotacion de la 
plataforma oceanica de Canarias 
(PLOCAN).  
14 December 2010 
and October 2012
4 13 7% 22% 71% 
University of East Anglia (UEA).  12 March 2010 and 
January 2012 
8 49 42% 50% 8% 
University of Cyprus (OC-UCY).  7 March 2009 and 
December 2011 
2 80 71% 29%  
Leibniz-Institut Fuer 
Meereswissenscaften an der (IFM-
GEOMAR).  
3 June 2011 and 
November 2012 
1 14 - - 100% 
Helmholtz-Zentrum Geesthacht Zentrum 
Fur Materialund Kustenforschung 
GMBH (HZG).  
12 December 2010 
and June 2012 
2 23 100% - - 
NATO Undersea Research Centre 
(NURC) 
63 June 2010 and 
September 2012 
8 4 33% 30% 37% 
The Scottish Association for Marine 
Science (SAMS)  
3 October 2009 and 
September 2012 
2 123 - 33% 67% 
Natural Environment Research Council 
(NERC) 
9 July 2010 and 
August 2012 
4 39 - 33% 67% 
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Table 2. Glider operation statistics 
 Seaglider 
1000m 
Slocum G1 
shallow 
Slocum G1 
Deep 
Slocum G2 
shallow  
Slocum G2 
deep 
Number of missions 42 68 72 9 14 
Total endurance [days] 2514.5 772.05 1728 188 550.1 
Median endurance [days]  64 7.65 19.5 18 12 
Upper quartile [days] 80 15 37 25 25.8 
Maximum endurance 
[days] 
169 56 105 48 184 
Number of Aborts due to 
failures 
19 13 23 3 5 
Abort rate (per day) 0.00756 0.0168 0.0133 0.0159 0.00909 
Number of losses 7 2 1 0 0 
3 
4 
5 
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Table 3. Breakdown of the top three failure modes and the confidence that the failure mode is vehicle 
dependent.  
Slocums Seaglider1000s 
Failure mode 
Number of failures Failure rate Number of failures Failure rate 
Confidence 
Leaks 14 0.0859 1 0.0238 91% 
Power/Battery 
failure 
3 0.0184 6 0.143 97% 
Buoyancy 
pump failure 
5 0.0307 1 0.0238 57% 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of the survival of different undersea glider makes. Deep gliders, include Seaglider1000, 
Slocum G1 deep and Slocum G2 deep. Shallow gliders include Slocum G1 shallow and Slocum G2 shallow.   
Deep gliders Shallow gliders 
Seaglider1000 compared to 
and Slocum G1 
Seaglider1000, Slocum deep 
G1 compared to Slocum 
deep G2 
Slocum G1 shallow 
compared to Slocum G2 
shallow  
Statistical 
test 
2  P 2  P 2  P 
Wilcoxon 
test 
1.4966 0.2212 2.2008 0.3327 0.4679 0.4938 
Log-ranktest 1.3823 0.2697 1.3787 0.5019 0.0003 0.9872 
11 
12 
13 
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Table 5. Statistics on the proportional hazards analysis. β1 is the proportional constant. L is the lower 
confidence limit and U is the upper confidence limit for the proportional constant.  
Covariate Scenario Statistics Shallow gliders Deep gliders 
β1 -0.009679 -0.001615 Abort 
P 0.0042 0.003 
β1 0.01969164 -0.0008827 
Operational 
depth 
Loss 
P 0.2526 0.5687 
β1 9.5424 0.1235 Altimeter 
status 
Loss 
P 0.0959 0.7379 
3 
4 
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Figure 1. Failure modes for all undersea gliders, shallow and deep. 
Figure 2. Probability of survival distributions: (a) Probability of surviving without aborting for shallow gliders. (b) 
Probability of surviving without aborting for deep gliders. (c) Probability of surviving, without loss, for shallow gliders. 
(c) Probability of surviving, without loss, for a deep glider. 
Figure 3. Probability of successfully completing the two observation targets for a fleet of 1-10 gliders. (a) Shallow 
gliders. (b) Deep gliders. 
Figure 4. Probability density function for the number of failures in a 90 day deployment of 10 gliders.  The probability 
of a single glider surviving a 90 day mission is assumed to be 0.5 (continuous line), 0.8 (dashed line), or 0.9 (dotted 
line). 
Figure 5. Undersea glider survival taking into account mitigation of the three top failure modes: leaks, battery failures 
and buoyancy pump failure..  (Left)  Shallow gliders. (Right) Deep gliders. 
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Figure 1. Failure modes for all undersea gliders, shallow and deep. 
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Figure 2. Probability of survival distributions: (a) Probability of surviving without aborting for shallow gliders. (b) 
Probability of surviving without aborting for deep gliders. (c) Probability of surviving, without loss, for shallow gliders. 
(c) Probability of surviving, without loss, for a deep glider. 
 
Figure 3. Probability of successfully completing the two observation targets (180 and 360 days)  for a single 
observation location for a fleet of 1-10 gliders. (a) Shallow gliders. (b) Deep gliders. Results are shown for the un-
mitigated case and for the case where the reliability of a shallow undersea glider, 60 day mission is improved to 90% 
and the reliability of a deep glider, 180 day mission, is improved to 90%. 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of gliders
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 of
 su
ce
ss
360 day mission
180 day mission
360 day mission ‐ 90% reliability
180 day mission ‐ 90% reliability
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of gliders
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 of
 su
ce
ss
360 day mission
180 day mission
360 day mission ‐ 90% reliability 
180 day mission ‐ 90% reliability
a 
d
b
c 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
S
ur
vi
vi
ng
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Endurance [days]
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
S
ur
vi
vi
ng
0 100 200
Mission Endurance [days]
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
S
ur
vi
vi
ng
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Endurance [days]
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
S
ur
vi
vi
ng
0 100 200
Mission Endurance [days]
28 
29 
1  
 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Figure 4  Probability density function for the number of failures in a 90 day deployment of 10 gliders. The probability 
of a single glider surviving a 90 day mission is assumed to be 0.5 (continuous line), 0.8 (dashed line), or 0.9 (dotted 
line). 
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Figure 5. Undersea glider survival taking into account mitigation of the three top failure modes: leaks, battery failures 
and buoyancy pump failure.  (Left)  Shallow gliders. (Right) Deep gliders. 
